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Abstract The use of psychopharmaceuticals to en-
hance human mental functioning such as cognition
and mood has raised a debate on questions regarding
identity and authenticity. While some hold that
psychopharmaceutical substances can help users to
‘become who they really are’ and thus strengthen
their identity and authenticity, others believe that the
substances will lead to inauthenticity, normalization,
and socially-enforced adaptation of behaviour and
personality. In light of this debate, we studied how
persons who actually have experience with the use of
psychopharmaceutical medication would view their
‘self’ or their authentic personal identity in relation to
the use of medication. We have interviewed a number
of adults diagnosed with ADHD and discussed their
experiences with medication use in relation to their
conceptions of self and identity. In the first part of this
paper we illustrate that the concepts of identity and
authenticity play an important and sometimes prob-
lematic role in experiences of ADHD adults. This
shows that the question about identity and psycho-
pharmacology is not merely an ‘academic’ issue, but
one that influences everyday lives of real people. In
order to answer the question whether psychopharma-
ceuticals threaten personal identity and authenticity,
more than empirical research is needed. We also need
to analyse the concepts of personal identity, authentic-
ity and self: what do we mean when we are using
statements as ‘a way of living that is uniquely our
own’, ‘our true self’, or ‘who we really are’? In the
second part of this paper we discuss two important
philosophical views on personal identity, authenticity
and self: the self-control view as elaborated by
Frankfurt, and the self-expression view as proposed
by Schechtman. We compare these with the experi-
ences of our respondents to see which view can help us
to understand the diverse and often conflicting expe-
riences that people have with medication for ADHD.
This will contribute to a better understanding of
whether and in which cases personal identity and
authenticity are threatened by psychopharmacology.
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Introduction
The use of psychopharmaceuticals has raised a debate
on the effects of these substances on persons. We do not
mean the medical risks and side-effects, such as the risk
of suicide assumed to be related to certain antidepres-
sants. Neither do we mean the debate about the
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compared to placebo. We focus on the discussion about
the claim that using psychopharmaceuticals may change
a person’s personal identity. Peter Kramer, the author of
the famous book ‘Listening to Prozac’ claims that some
people using Prozac feel as though their ‘real self’
finally emerges [1]. These people claim that using
Prozac changes their personality in a way that makes
them more truly themselves. In opposition to this
claim, some authors, most notably Carl Elliott, have
argued that the use of psychopharmaceuticals may be a
threat to personal identity and authenticity: it may
seriously threaten “a way of living that is uniquely our
own and not that of someone else”… “that it threatens
to separate us from who we really are and how the
world really is” [2–3]. Our true, real self is at stake.
Such allegations are raised specifically with respect
to psychopharmaceuticals, i.e. drugs for mental con-
ditions, and much less or not at all for drugs for
physical diseases such as heart diseases, cancer or
diabetes. Therefore, it is not surprising that the debate
between critics and proponents of the development
and use of psychopharmaceutical enhancers also
involves the specific nature of mental conditions.
For example, Kramer argues that depression should
be seen as a disease in the same way as tuberculosis,
asthma or heart diseases, while Elliott wants to show
the unique nature of mental conditions. What makes
these conditions unique is that consciousness and
subjectivity are inherent in them—that they cannot be
understood solely in physiological terms.
Elliott also points out the danger of medicalization
which entails that more and more normal character
traits and behaviours, such as shyness or gloominess,
are being medicalized. He considers this a bad thing
not just because therapies may be risky and have side-
effects and may turn out to be more harmful than
beneficial, but also because of the expansion of
diagnostic categories: “Should I really feel better
about having my native gloominess classified as a
psychiatric disorder for which I will be encouraged
(or even compelled) to seek treatment?” [4: 170].
Although Elliott explicitly states that he does not
adhere to the view of an essentialist self (i.e. a self
with fixed and essential characteristics), he unfortu-
nately remains rather vague about what it means to be
authentic or really yourself. Elliott contrasts authen-
ticity with alienation while alienation seems to involve
two phenomena: 1) the phenomena of political
quietism, societal pressure, medicalization and disease
mongering1, and 2) the loss of touch with the real
world and real experiences. Elliott uses the example
of Sisyphus to illustrate that psychiatry has difficulty
in dealing with the concept of alienation and to
question whether psychological well-being is the sole
measure of a successful life. “Is a medicated Sisyphus
obviously better off than an unmedicated Sisyphus?”
[2: 171].
The proponents argue differently. They claim that
psychopharmaceutical enhancers may in fact help us to
become who we really are, to help us to a way of living
that is uniquely ours. Personal identity, according to
this view, is not a stable, static ‘thing’ and, although it
is not malleable in every conceivable way either, we
are capable of changing our ways while staying
ourselves. According to DeGrazia for example,
Elliott’s’ view on self and personal identity is mis-
taken. The self is not “given”, it is not “a pre-existing
reality” [6: 37]. He argues that whether personal
characteristics are definitive of someone depends on
“whether she identifies with them—whether she owns
them (pun intended!) autonomously” [6: 37].
In light of this debate, we were interested to know
how persons who actually have experience with the
use of psychopharmaceutical medication would view
their ‘self’ or their authentic personal identity in
relation to the use of medication. Because we
believed that these experiences would add to the
theoretical discussion, we have interviewed a number
of adults diagnosed with ADHD and discussed their
experiences with medication use in relation to their
conceptions of self and identity.2 In the first part of
this paper we illustrate that the concepts of identity
and authenticity play an important and sometimes
1 Disease mongering can be defined as “the selling of sickness
that widens the boundaries of illness and enlarges the markets
for those who sell and deliver treatments” [5]
2 Our initial intention was to interview persons that used
psychopharmacological enhancers; however, this proved to be
complicated because not many ‘real’ enhancers are available
yet and, even if some people use substances to improve their
performance, it would have been very difficult to find them. We
therefore decided to look for people in the grey area between
treatment and clear enhancement, a group for which it would be
debatable whether we were talking about therapy or something
beyond that; we finally decided on adults with ADHD. There
has been a debate about Ritalin for children and whether this
should be seen as treatment or enhancement and whether such
drugs have implications for the authentic self (Singh [8–10],
whereas the whole category of adult ADHD is relatively new
and not yet well discussed.
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problematic role in the experiences of ADHD adults.
This shows that the question about identity and
psychopharmacology is not merely an ‘academic’
issue, but one that influences everyday lives of real
people [7–10].
Empirical research alone, however, cannot answer
the question whether psychopharmaceuticals threaten
personal identity and authenticity. We also need to
analyse the concepts of personal identity, authenticity
and self: what do we mean when we use statements
such as: ‘a way of living that is uniquely our own’, ‘our
true self’, or ‘who we really are’? In the second part of
this paper we discuss two important philosophical
views on personal identity, authenticity and self: the
self-control view as elaborated by Frankfurt, and the
self-expression view as proposed by Schechtman. We
compare these with the experiences of our respondents
to see which view can help us to understand the diverse
and often conflicting experiences that people have
with medication for ADHD. This will contribute to a
better understanding of whether, and in which cases,
personal identity and authenticity are threatened by
psychopharmacology.
Identity, Self and ADHD Adults
Methodology
We have interviewed 19 people (10 men and 9 women,
ages ranging from 21–59 years) living in different
regions in the Netherlands, and from different socio-
economic backgrounds. They had been diagnosed
with ADHD between 3 years and 10 years previously
and all had been diagnosed when they were adults
(i.e. not in their childhood). The respondents were
recruited by posting a request on the website for the
patient group of ADHD adults, as well as in their
newsletter. After the first series of about 11 interviews,
we also intentionally included a number of people who
deliberately decided not to take medication for their
ADHD condition.
We used a semi-structured design, with a list of
open questions, touching first on the diagnosis and
their ideas concerning the disorder itself and then
turning to their experiences with medication, and their
reasons to use medication or to refrain from using it.
Interviews lasted for 1 to 1½ hour and were
audiotaped and later transcribed.
We analysed the interviews in a qualitative way, by
assigning codes (keywords) to interview fragments and
ordering them accordingly. We took a hermeneutical
perspective, meaning that we aim to grasp the sub-
jective reality of living with ADHD and with (or
without) medication.
Results
For most respondents it appeared difficult to separate
their personality or character from their disorder.3
ADHD was perceived either to have an impact on
their personality, or to have contributed to the
development of their personality, or it was said to be
intertwined with their personality. For many it was a
confusing and puzzling issue. “I believe that besides
having ADHD I’m also an active and lively person.
But well, it’s not easy to separate these things now.”
Another respondent put it this way: “… it is
intertwined in such a way that you can’t tell where
the personality disorder ends and the lack of or the
disposal of dopamine, or however you want to put it,
starts.” And yet another person said: “You don’t have
ADHD, you are ADHD”.
Apart from the difficulty in distinguishing their ‘real
self’ from their disorder, many respondents experienced
that the use of medication changed their personality or
their self to some degree.4 They felt less themselves on
medication, less authentic. Some character traits that
they liked have changed because of the medication.
They felt less creative, spontaneous, happy, funny or
sociable; almost all qualified this as a loss. Some stated
explicitly that this was the reverse side of the choice to
be on medication: medication brings advantages and if
you want these, you just have to bear the disadvantages
that come with it. As one respondent said: “Now I can
keep my job for more than half a year, and I can
complete my schooling. People seem to be more
pleased with me.”
For others, however, feeling less themselves was
the main reason for their choice to abstain from
3 The respondents were asked whether they consider ADHD a
disease or rather something that belongs to their personality.
4 Part of the questions concerned the influence and effects of
using (or not using) medication on their life. We also asked the
respondents whether being on or off medication influenced
their self, their personality. However, we did not define these
terms but instead asked further questions (such as ‘how do you
view yourself on and off medication?’).
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medication. One respondent told us that on medica-
tion there seemed to be no challenges anymore and no
fun: “… in former days I used to sing a lot at home
and now I was quiet. And well, I guess that at a
certain moment I missed myself. And I thought: well
let’s see if I can do without [the medication]”.
Another respondent told us that on medication he
appeared to be indifferent and more cynical and he
did not like that. He decided to use medication only
when necessary for certain job activities but to
abstain from medication in his private life. Although
there were disadvantages, he said: “I prefer to be
myself in my private life. Just being myself is like I
was as a teenager without medication.” He called
this “my first self”. Medication is just an aid to do his
job: “I accept that the working man in me needs this
kind of backing”. This respondent described himself
as “a switchable personality”. According to him,
being on medication also influenced what kind of
people he chooses as his friends. “I think that,
depending on whether you are timid and shy or
energetic and very lively, you will assemble other
kinds of friends.”
Two other respondents also mentioned the influence
on friends. One of them told us that a member of his
ADHD adult group had changed in such a way, due to
the medication, that his friends did not want to be
friends anymore. “A member of my ADHD group
found out he had ADHD at the age of 38. And then he
began to use Ritalin, and he changed in such a way
that his friends said: ‘… you’re still a nice guy but
you’re not the person we want to associate with’.
That’s how much he had changed.” This story clearly
frightened our respondent and he was of the opinion
that this person should not have changed himself. “I
think you keep fighting against yourself your whole
life, if you don’t accept the way you are.” According
to him, one should look for a job that is suitable for
you, and choose friends that accept you the way you
are. “And I think that this is possible. I think that to do
that is better than to stuff oneself with medication in
order to have a job at the office because that’s what
you’re supposed to do.”
Societal pressure to conform to an ideal was also
mentioned by other respondents. One said that she
valued diversity and was afraid of pressure to
conform to a uniform ideal of personality; she
compared this to the pressures exerted with respect
to cosmetic surgery nowadays.
Some respondents described positive effects of
medication on their personality or stated they felt
more themselves on medication. One respondent said
that the medication allowed her to explore more sides
of herself and to see a different I. “It’s not that you’re
not yourself anymore. I believe I have always been
myself, but because the medication makes you more
tranquil you start to look differently at yourself. You
take more time for yourself. And you discover things
that you did not expect of yourself.” In fact, she
discovered that she was a good painter and enjoyed
painting a lot. Another respondent also said that he
felt more ‘himself’ on medication. He was more able
to control his impulses and his life moved more
smoothly. He also felt calmer on medication and this
gave him more ‘time for himself’: “I haven’t read a
book in years because I couldn’t concentrate. But now
I’m reading again. I used to read a lot when I was
younger”. However, when he went to a party he chose
to abstain from medication in order to be more
sociable; off medication he felt more involved in the
things around him.
Finally, some respondents stated that medication
did not influence their self or personality at all. One of
them, however, did not use ADHD medication but an
antidepressant. Another respondent said she could not
imagine any medication that would change the way
she was leading her life. “Am I a different person
when I have fever? No. I behave differently, but I’m
not a different person.” She describes medication as a
mechanical process: “… in case of a creaky door I put
oil on the hinges”. However, if medication were to
change certain traits like spontaneity or creativity, she
would decide to abstain from medication.
Another respondent also declared medication did
not change his identity: “No, I remain who I am
because there are still times that I have no control
over myself. At other moments I do have control—
that is because I want it myself. I do think I am
changing. But that is me. Also because I want it.”
A respondent, who claimed that medication did not
change her self, told us that she never went to a party
without taking her medication: “Am I myself in that case
or not? I don’t know. But I do know that if I went to the
party off medication I would become very vivacious
and I notice that people think that I have crossed the
line. And that makes me insecure and not happy.”
To summarize, most respondents experience that
medication influences their emotion and behaviour in
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the sense that they lose part of their creativity,
spontaneity, and sociability. This fact forces them to
make a trade-off: how important is it to be funny,
lively and impulsive, how important is it to be able to
study, keep one’s job, etc. For some of them the
disadvantages of medication outweigh the advan-
tages: on medication they feel less themselves and
therefore they choose to be off medication. For others,
however, medication gives them the opportunity to
complete their training and schooling, or to keep their
jobs, or to have fulfilling relationships. Put differently,
it enables them to do things they value deeply but
were unable to do because of their lack of concentra-
tion and inability to control their impulses.
Two respondents described the influence of medica-
tion in positive terms because it gave them opportunity
to change and to discover new aspects of themselves.
While some respondents seem to succeed in
accepting their situation (either by accepting that they
need medication to achieve the things they value, or
by accepting the way they are off medication), others
experience ambivalence: on the one hand they want to
be able to achieve some things and on the other they
like the way they are and do not want to change their
self in order to be more agreeable for others or for a
more successful life. Some experiment with medica-
tion in order to find a balance, for example by being
off medication in their private life and on medication
during work.
Philosophical Views on Self, Personal Identity
and Authenticity
Among the ADHD adults that we interviewed, do the
changes caused by psychopharmaceutical medication
make them somehow less authentic, less true to their real
selves? This depends not only on the empirical data, but
also on the conceptions of self, personal identity and
authenticity that one adopts. Here, we discuss two
different views and assess how the experiences of the
respondents can be related to these views. Following
Schechtman, we distinguish between a ‘self-control’
view and a ‘self-expression’ view of the self [11].
Self-Control View
Schechtman uses the work of Frankfurt to represent
the self-control view. Other authors who take a similar
position are Gerald Dworkin [12] and, more recently,
[13]. Of central importance to Frankfurt’s account of
the self is the notion of freedom of will [14–15]. What
is distinctive of human beings is that they do not only
have desires and motives that move them to do things,
but that they want to have certain desires and motives.
In case of conflicting desires they are not simply led
by the strongest desire, but they have the capacity to
‘take sides’. To illustrate his view Frankfurt uses the
example of the unwilling addict who repudiates his
desire for drugs and is struggling hard to resist his
desire but in the end slides back in his craving for
drugs. The action in this case does not belong to the
addict; it is not the agent’s real desire leading to the
action but the addiction. The addict has conflicting
first-order desires: the desire to give in to his
addiction and a desire to resist his craving for drugs.
He may also have a second-order desire: he desires
that his desire to give in does not lead him to action.
In that case he identifies with his desire to resist his
craving for drugs. If nevertheless he loses ground and
is moved by his desire for drugs, the addict’s action is
not an action of free will5. The act is, in other words,
not really his own.
One of the problems with this view of identifica-
tion is that it leads to an infinite regress problem:
second-order desires can also be in conflict with each
other, in which case an appeal to third-order desires is
needed to resolve it, these third-order desires can also
be in conflict and so on, resulting in the infinite
regress problem.
Frankfurt attempts to solve this problem by intro-
ducing the concept of ‘wholeheartedness’ [14]. A self-
constituting identification must be ‘wholehearted’;
this means that we must make a decision without
reservation, that we want a certain desire to be our
will. In later texts Frankfurt defines wholeheartedness
as a certain kind of stability or equilibrium with
respect to our higher-order attitudes. According to
Schechtman both interpretations of wholeheartedness
come down to the same idea: “What is required to
identify with–or repudiate–a desire, is to achieve a
certain sort of stability or equilibrium with respect to
one’s attitude towards it” [11: 412]. Schechtman
characterizes Frankfurt’s view as ‘the self-control
view’ because it implies that control over one’s
5 The will, in Frankfurt’s account, is the desire that leads one to
action.
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desires is central. We can not be our true selves if our
self-control is compromised. If we do not succeed in
resisting a powerful desire, a desire that is whole-
heartedly repudiated, and we act on it, we have failed
to be ourselves [11: 413].
In the account of DeGrazia, someone is authentic, or
truly himself, if and when his choices are autonomous.
DeGrazia follows Dworkin’s account of autonomy,
which is similar to Frankfurt’s account of free will. Also
here, the notion of identification is important and this
identification should be formed in the absence of
illegitimate, alienating influences. “A autonomously
performs intentional action X if and only if (1) A does
X because she prefers to do X, (2) A has this preference
because she (at least dispositionally) identifies with
and prefers to have it, and (3) this identification has
not resulted primarily from influences that A would, on
careful reflection, consider alienating” [13: 102]
ADHD, Medication, and Self-Control
If we look at the experiences of our respondents we
can recognize this self-control view in some of their
accounts. Some clearly identified with their desire to
use medication in order to complete schooling, to
finalize a PhD thesis, to be able to do a job suc-
cessfully, or to be pleasant company and to have good
relationships. One could, following Dworkin and
DeGrazia, characterize their decision as autonomous.
The idea of self-control can also be noticed in the
experience of one of the respondents who claims
(somewhat cryptically) that his personality has not
been changed by medication because he still has
moments of loss of control, and when he is in control
it is because he wants it. Medication might even result
in more control if it results in more insight in aspects
of oneself: see, for example, one of the respondents
who said she became aware of new aspects of herself
and who found a new desire she could identify with,
i.e. to paint. Moreover, the self-control view can also
be discerned in the experiences of respondents who
decided to abstain from medication because off
medication they felt more authentic. They identified
with the desire to be spontaneous, creative, funny, and
so on, and acted accordingly by not taking medication
that would diminish these traits.
However, it seems as if some other experiences
cannot be fully captured by Frankfurt’s self-control
view. First, his view fails to make explicit that,
although one might make an autonomous choice to
use medication in order to complete for example,
one’s schooling, you have to pay a (significant) price
for this: the loss of characteristics that you feel are
important for your identity, like spontaneity, having
up and down sides, being energetic and creative or
funny. For our respondents this often meant that the
choice for a certain degree of well-being and func-
tioning implied a significant loss of self. They literally
felt less themselves. Second, some respondents chose
to use medication but seemed to do so to conform
themselves to the expectations of others. “I often think
that it [the medication] is more for the benefit of the
outside world that I’m more adjusted, than for my
own benefit. I wonder. On the other hand, however, I
do notice that I’m functioning better.” Some stressed
the need to accept yourself as you are: “I think you
keep fighting against yourself your whole life, if you
don’t accept the way you are”. Third, respondents
seem to experiment with medication, to find out what
works for them (e.g. medication in order to function
properly during work) but also to find out who they
are off medication. The same experience can be seen
in adults suffering from depression. Karp describes in
his book ‘Is it me or my meds?’ that the interviewees
wanted to know how they would be off medication:
“For many the urge to know one’s true self prompted
ongoing experimentation with medications” [16]: 117.
Self-Expression View
In order to understand these kinds of experiences we
need a different view of the self, and we think
Schechtman’s self-expression view might be of help
here. According to Schechtman the self-control view
provides a legitimate view on what it means for a
person to be herself, but it fails to fully capture what
it means to be oneself, since being oneself also
involves expressing one’s nature and, interestingly,
self-control can sometimes prevent this. Schechtman
uses Friedman’s example of the 50’s wife to explain
this. The 50’s wife is a housewife living in the 1950s
in a traditional American town. She is raised in a
family and environment holding traditional views on
the duties of women as wives and mothers. Although
she conforms to those views, she is often troubled by
desires to have a job, take schooling, spend time with
her friends, and to become politically active. She
repudiates these desires, sees them as unfeminine and
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selfish and is struggling to resist them. The 50’s wife
might even decide to use Valium in order not to give
in. She may avoid friends who might support her in
exploring her own interests. Moreover, the 50’s wife
wholeheartedly conforms to the traditional views: she
is not in conflict about her non-traditional desires, she
never wonders whether the duties of a good woman
and mother are worthy or not. She is steadfast in her
decision to conform.
Schechtman argues that the self-control view is not
able to put to rest the intuition that the 50’s woman is
not leading a life of her own.6 Her situation is in a
way similar to that of the unwilling addict: if she
gives in to her desire for a different life, she is acting
against what she most wants to do. For Schechtman,
however, she is herself in one sense (the self-control
sense), but she is not herself in another: her desire to
conform to tradition prevents her from expressing
herself. “At the same time, it also seems right that
being oneself involves expressing one’s nature. There
is a clear sense in which the 50’s wife, when she is in
command of her will, is using it to keep her from
being herself” [11: 420].
Moreover, Schechtman argues that the self-control
view implies an active role: “The self-control view
insists that we must be active with respect to any
inclination which can be considered our own” [11:
425]. Interestingly, however, we also believe that a
person can be herself in cases where self-control is
absent: “people are often most truly themselves when
inhibition fails” [11: 413].
Schechtman thus introduces an alternative view on
the self, the self-expression view: “we are most
ourselves when our acts express our nature” [11:
409]. At first sight, this view entails that any
spontaneous desire can be characterized as one’s
own, but that is not the case. The self consists of ‘a
set of natural inclinations and traits’. Inclinations and
traits can be considered natural if they satisfy a few
basic conditions:
& “inclinations must be relatively stable, coherent
and powerful”;
& “inclinations must not originate in obvious physical
or psychological diseases”;
& “self-defining inclinations are desires for a way of
being or a type of life” [11: 415].
Her view of a self boils down to “a self” that exists
in “a person’s robust inclinations” that subsequently
are part of “a person’s nature”. We are not being
ourselves or our desires are not truly our own, “…when
we fail to express some part of our nature”.
Schechtman states that the two views on self are
both legitimate, but capture different senses of what it
means to be ourselves: “The self-control view
expresses the fact that we are alienated from our
actions when we cannot control or direct them; the
self-expression view that we are alienated when our
lives do not express our natures” [11: 424]. These two
views are linked in a certain way because in both
cases being oneself is an essential part of living a
meaningful or fulfilling life. The views show two
different ways in which the capacity to lead a
meaningful and fulfilling life can be threatened, two
ways in which alienation can occur. Schechtman
argues for an integrated view which implies finding
the appropriate balance between them. “To be our-
selves we must govern our lives in a way that avoids
this alienation - carefully balancing the demands of
self-expression and self-control” [11: 427].
While the self-control view demands activity and
unity, the self-expression view implies a certain
amount of passivity, and a certain toleration of
ambivalence. As we more often than not lack perfect
insight in our inclinations and do not know in advance
which actions are meaningful for us, a certain amount
of experimentation is needed: to explore different
possibilities, to change our ways to see whether
alternative ways might work better. In some cases this
might involve a passive attitude or a ‘letting go’ rather
than an active and controlling stance.
We believe the self-expression view is helpful in
capturing those experiences of ADHD adults that
could not be adequately understood from a self-
control view. It can account for the unease of some
respondents who felt less themselves, and who
identified more with their personalities off medication
6 According to DeGrazia it is unlikely that his account of
autonomy would characterize the 50’s wife as autonomous
because the woman “would consider alienating the influences
that shaped the identification in question if they were brought to
light along other possible roles for women”. [13]: 103-4 The
emphasis on careful reflection, however, will not preclude the
possibility that she would (after careful reflection) hold her
traditional views and choose such a lifestyle autonomously.
DeGrazia acknowledges that and concludes by saying we
should either accept this or add an extra condition (e.g. a
healthy self-respect).
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than they did with their medicated selves, even when
they acknowledged and appreciated the benefits.
Schechtman’s account is also able to acknowledge
the concerns of Elliott regarding the alienation which
can occur if people conform to cultural patterns or
social expectations to such an extent that they ‘lose
themselves’. The self-expression view also shows the
need for experimentation.
However, Schechtman seems to put aside too
easily the questions that are being raised by one of
her conditions for inclinations to be natural that is
“inclinations must not originate in obvious physical
or psychological diseases”. She mentions “brain
tumours, physical addictions, obsessive-compulsive
disorder, and similar sources of impulsive desires”
[11: 415]. Exactly at this point, however, lies one of
the controversies of the debate on the use of
psychopharmaceuticals. As mentioned in the intro-
duction, some claim that gloominess or shyness are
natural traits, while others tend to call these a disease
or a disorder. Our respondents also found it difficult
to decide whether their inclinations and traits were
natural parts of themselves, or expressions of a
‘mental disease’.
Finally, Schechtman’s self-expression view does
not seem able to account for a specific kind of
alienation: alienation in the sense that by using
medication one might lose contact with reality. This
is what Elliott aims at when he argues that experience
of happiness is not all there is. A good life does not
consist of a series of happy feelings or an overall
feeling of self-contentment, we want to have real
experiences (see Nozick’s experience machine). For
example, if a man lost his wife he should feel sad; it is
a proper response. Prescribing medication would not
only prevent this man from understanding what the
death of his wife means [17: 116], but using
medication in cases like this might also be in
contradiction with how a human being should
respond to the loss of a significant other human
being. Authenticity and alienation in this context may
eventually raise questions concerning the good life
and what it means to be human [18].
Conclusions
Questions regarding identity and authenticity are a
central issue in the enhancement debate, especially
enhancement by psychopharmacological substances.
Proponents of enhancement hold that psychopharma-
cological substances can help users to ‘become who
they really are’ and thus strengthen their identity and
authenticity. Critics, however, believe that the sub-
stances will lead to inauthenticity, normalization, and
socially-enforced adaptation of behaviour and person-
ality. Our empirical research shows that the philosoph-
ical debate about personal identity, authenticity and
psychopharmaceutical enhancers is not just an aca-
demic issue: authenticity and personal identity do play
an important role in the experiences and narratives of
ADHD adults. The use of medication in particular may
confront them with questions concerning personal
identity. Do I feel myself off or on medication? Does
the medication obscure or reveal my true self? Should
I use medication for certain reasons even though this
may change who I am in a certain way? Our
respondents try to work out their experiences in terms
of loss of self and authenticity (‘who I really am’).
The debate on the question whether or not psycho-
pharmaceuticals are a threat to personal identity and
authenticity can not be resolved by merely referring to
empirical research. In order to answer this question we
need concepts of personal identity and authenticity.
The self-control view and the self-expression view, as
distinguished by Schechtman, can be of help to
understand the experiences of ADHD adults. Whereas
a self-control view is characterized by identification
with first-order desires and the absence of alienating
influences, the self-expression view holds that we are
most ourselves when our actions express our nature.
Some of our respondents’ experiences can be
understood in terms of self-control. For example, if
an ADHD adult identifies with his/her desire to be
more stable, calm and serene, his/her decision to be on
medication can be seen as an action of free will. Or, if
an ADHD adult identifies with his/her desire to be
spontaneous, creative and sociable, his/her choice to be
off medication can be characterized as authentic.7
Other experiences, however, can not be fully captured
by the self-control view. For some respondents the
choice to be on medication, although authentic along
the lines of the self-control view, implies a significant
7 One has to be careful not to conflate spontaneity and
authenticity, not to equate self-expression and spontaneity. If
an ADHD adult identifies with his/her desire to be spontaneous
and decides to be off medication, this act can be understood in
terms of the self-control view.
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loss of self. For others, medication helped them to
discover new sides of themselves they had not realized
they possessed before. Moreover, a choice to be on
medication may spring from a failure to express one’s
personality and to conform to a lifestyle along the line
of societal expectations. Some respondents were
anxious about pressures to conform to a certain
lifestyle, to become a kind of person that is valued in
society but who they feel would not really be ‘them’.
Conforming to society’s standards may come at a price
if one fails to express one’s nature. Due to its emphasis
on self-control, on unifying first and second-order
desires, ambivalence is valued negatively in the self-
control view. The self-expression view, however,
pleads for a toleration of ambivalence and emphasizes
the need for experimentation. We do not have perfect
insight into our desires and in order to discover what
kind of life is the most meaningful for us, ambivalence
and experimentation may be appropriate.
Psychopharmaceutical medication, therefore, does
not necessarily endanger authenticity, neither according
to the self-control view nor according to the self-
expression view. Authenticity, however, may be jeopar-
dized if the focus is solely on medication, if alternative
ways of dealing with one’s nature are neglected, and
when social pressures are the main reason to conform.
One respondent formulates it thus: “Society should
make room for people who do not fit in easily”.
As Schechtman argues, the self-control and the
self-expression view capture what it means to be
oneself and both argue that failing to be oneself is at
the expense of something important. Alienation can
occur if one is not able to control one’s actions and
one’s course in life, but also if our lives do not
express our nature. Both views should be balanced to
fully understand what it means to be really oneself.
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